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Abstract
Using the representation introduced in our another paper[1], the well-known
Quantum Prisoner’s Dilemma proposed in [2], is reexpressed and calculated. By
this example and the works in [1] on classical games and Quantum Penny Flip
game, which first proposed in [3], we show that our new representation can be a
general framework for games originally in different forms.
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Introduction — Recently, we proposed a new mathematical representation[1] for
Classical and Quantum Game Theory. It has been shown than N -player classical
games, which are traditionally defined by N single-player strategy sets and (0, N)-
tensor payoff functions, can be equivalently reexpressed in the new representation, by
a system strategy space and N (1, 1)-tensor payoff functions. In the same paper, the
well-known Quantum Penny Flip game[3] has also been rewritten by the new language.
In another paper[5], we apply the new representation onto Battle of the Sexes and get
some interesting results such as entangled strategy equilibrium state. Although our
new representation is defined as an abstract form, which is believed be able to describe
any specific games, it seems still necessary to discuss more famous games as examples
by this new language. So in this paper, we try to describe in the new representation a
well-known game proposed in [2], the Quantum Prisoner’s Dilemma.
The original Quantum Prisoner’s Dilemma — First, we follow the definition in [2],
but reexpress it in density matrix form instead of the original state vector form, and
give the manipulative definition proposed in [6],
Γq,o =
(
ρq0 ∈ Hq,
N∏
i=1
⊗Hi,L,{P i}
)
. (1)
A two-particle quantum system is used as the quantum object in the game, which
has the Hilbert space formed by base vectors |UU〉 , |UD〉 , |DU〉 , |DD〉. Here |UU〉
represents the state that particle 1 and particle 2 stay on |U〉. We also suppose they
1
are distinguishable, named 1 and 2 respectively. The initial state of the quantum object
is
ρq0 = |UU〉 〈UU | =


1 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0

 . (2)
A typical strategy players can use is
Uˆ(θ, φ) =
[
eiφ cos θ/2 sin θ/2
− sin θ/2 e−iφ cos θ/2
]
. (3)
So player 1’s strategy space is the above unitary operator acting on particle 1, and
similarly for player 2. The payoff value is determined by
Ei = Tr
(
Gi
(
Uˆ1 ⊗ Uˆ2
)
ρ0
(
Uˆ1 ⊗ Uˆ2
)†)
, (4)
in which, if defined in the base vectors above, the payoff scale matrix P i is
P 1 =


r 0 0 0
0 s 0 0
0 0 t 0
0 0 0 p

 and P 2 =


r 0 0 0
0 t 0 0
0 0 s 0
0 0 0 p

 . (5)
So mapping L
(
Uˆ1, Uˆ2
)
= Uˆ1 ⊗ Uˆ2. Classical pure strategies are
N c =
[
1 0
0 1
]
and F c =
[
0 1
1 0
]
. (6)
If players can only use classical strategies, we can check that the payoff from equ(4)
equal to the classical payoff defined as
G1,c =
[
r s
t p
]
and G2,c =
[
r t
s p
]
. (7)
For example, we check the situation when both the two players choose N c. N c acting
on |U〉 gives |U〉, so the end state of the quantum object is still |UU〉. So the first
elements of G1,c and G2,c are r and r.
Quantum Prisoner’s Dilemma in the new representation — Now we try to derive
the abstract form[1, 6],
Γq =
(
N∏
i=1
⊗Sqi ,
{
H i
})
. (8)
The central idea of our new representation is to find a set of base vectors for strategy,
and to defined inner product between them so as to form them as a Hilbert space. And
then redefined payoff function as a mapping from the system strategy space to real
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number. Here, we have four good and natural base strategies. Besides the two classical
pure strategies in equ(6), we still have
N q =
[
1 0
0 −1
]
and F q =
[
0 −i
i 0
]
, (9)
which we named as quantum base strategies. A general quantum strategy in equ(3)
can be expanded as
Uˆ (θ, φ) = cos
θ
2
cosφN c + i cos
θ
2
sinφN q + i sin
θ
2
F q. (10)
A more general operator can be
Uˆ = ξ ·N c + x · F c + y · F q + z ·N q, (ξ, x, y, z ∈ C) . (11)
Or if we require s is unitary, in a set of independent parameters[4],
Uˆ = cos
γ
2
cos
α+ β
2
N c−i sin γ
2
sin
α− β
2
F c−i sin γ
2
cos
α− β
2
F q−i cos γ
2
sin
α+ β
2
N q.
(12)
The inner product is defined as
(
s, s
′
)
=
Tr
(
s†s
′
)
Tr (I)
. (13)
Then (N c, F c, N q, F q) are orthogonal and normalized. Later on we denote them as
base vectors such as |N c〉. A system strategy space is the direct product space of the
two players, so it has 16 base vectors such as |N c, N c〉. A state in the system strategy
space can be
|S〉 = ∣∣s1, s2〉 . (14)
Now we try to define (1, 1)-tensor payoff matrix H i so that
Ei (S) = 〈S|H i |S〉 ,∀S. (15)
In [1], a general procedure has been proposed, that first to define its elements on a
specific set of base vectors, then prove it can be used for any states. Now elements of
the payoff matrix is defined
H iαβ = 〈α|H i |β〉 =
〈
α1, α2
∣∣H i ∣∣β1, β2〉 = Tr (P i (β1 ⊗ β2) ρ0 (α1 ⊗ α2)†) , (16)
in which αi, βi are anyone of the predefined base vectors (N c, F c, N q, F q). Before we
calculate all the values of the elements, we need to prove the definition in equ(16)
guarantee equ(15) is valid for any strategy.
Theorem Suppose |S〉 = ∣∣s1, s2〉, ∀s1, s2, for the payoff matrix H i defined in equ(16),
prove that Ei (S) = Tr
(
P i
(
s1 ⊗ s2) ρ0 (s1 ⊗ s2)†) equals 〈S|H i |S〉 = 〈s1, s2∣∣H i ∣∣s1, s2〉.
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Proof If s1, s2 are the base vectors, this is just the definition of H i. So it’s obvious.
We claim that
(
s1 ⊗ s2)† = (s1)† ⊗ (s2)†, xα · s1α ⊗ yν · s2ν = xαyν · s1α ⊗ s2ν and(
s1α + s
1
β
)
⊗ (s2µ + s2ν) = s1α ⊗ s2µ + s2β ⊗ s2µ + s1α ⊗ s2ν + s1β ⊗ s2ν . The proof of a general
strategy S will need all of these relations, which are easy to check. Now we suppose
si =
∑
µ x
i
µ |µ〉. Then
Tr
(
P i
(
s1 ⊗ s2) ρ0 (s1 ⊗ s2)†) = Tr (P i (s1 ⊗ s2) ρ0 (s1)† ⊗ (s2)†)
= Tr
(
P i
∑
µ,ν x
1
µx
2
νµ⊗ νρ0
(∑
ξ x
1
ξξ
)†
⊗
(∑
η x
2
ηη
)†)
= Tr
(
P i
∑
µ,ν x
1
µx
2
νµ⊗ νρ0
∑
ξ,η x¯
1
ξ x¯
2
ηξ
† ⊗ η†
)
= Tr
(
P i
∑
µ,ν,ξ,η x
1
µx
2
ν x¯
1
ξ x¯
2
ηµ⊗ νρ0ξ† ⊗ η†
)
=
∑
µ,ν,ξ,η x
1
µx
2
ν x¯
1
ξ x¯
2
ηTr
(
P iµ⊗ νρ0ξ† ⊗ η†
)
=
∑
µ,ν,ξ,η x
1
µx
2
ν x¯
1
ξ x¯
2
η 〈ξ, η |H|µ, ν〉
and
〈S|H i |S〉 = 〈s1, s2∣∣H i ∣∣s1, s2〉
=
∑
ξ,η x¯
1
ξ x¯
2
η
〈
ξ
∣∣∣〈η ∣∣∣H∑µ,ν x1µx2ν∣∣∣µ〉∣∣∣ ν〉
=
∑
µ,ν,ξ,η x
1
µx
2
ν x¯
1
ξ x¯
2
η 〈ξ, η |H|µ, ν〉
So they are equal, and we get equ(15). The payoff matrix H1,H2 in the base vectors
(N c, F c, N q, F q) are
H1 =


r 0 r 0 0 0 0 0 r 0 r 0 0 0 0 0
0 s 0 is 0 0 0 0 0 s 0 is 0 0 0 0
r 0 r 0 0 0 0 0 r 0 r 0 0 0 0 0
0 −is 0 s 0 0 0 0 0 −is 0 s 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 t 0 t 0 0 0 0 0 it 0 it 0
0 0 0 0 0 p 0 ip 0 0 0 0 0 ip 0 −p
0 0 0 0 t 0 t 0 0 0 0 0 it 0 it 0
0 0 0 0 0 −ip 0 p 0 0 0 0 0 p 0 ip
r 0 r 0 0 0 0 0 r 0 r 0 0 0 0 0
0 s 0 is 0 0 0 0 0 s 0 is 0 0 0 0
r 0 r 0 0 0 0 0 r 0 r 0 0 0 0 0
0 −is 0 s 0 0 0 0 0 −is 0 s 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 −it 0 −it 0 0 0 0 0 t 0 t 0
0 0 0 0 0 −ip 0 p 0 0 0 0 0 p 0 ip
0 0 0 0 −it 0 −it 0 0 0 0 0 t 0 t 0
0 0 0 0 0 −p 0 −ip 0 0 0 0 0 −ip 0 p


,
(17)
and
H2 = H1 (t⇄ s) . (18)
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For classical game, the base vectors are only N c, F c, then the sub-matrix are
H1,c =


r 0 0 0
0 s 0 0
0 0 t 0
0 0 0 p

 and H2,c =


r 0 0 0
0 t 0 0
0 0 s 0
0 0 0 p

 . (19)
They are equivalent with the payoff matrix directly reexpressed into our new represen-
tation from G1,c, G2,c.
Density matrix form of the game — For a quantum system state, equ(15) can be
used to calculated the payoff value. But a classical mixture strategy with probability
pinc on N
c and pifc on F
c is impossible to rewritten as the vector form as equ(11). In
order to compare quantum strategy with classical strategy, we have to define a more
general strategy form. In [1], a density matrix form is used, such as
ρS,c =
(
p1nc |N c〉 〈N c|+ p1nc |N c〉 〈N c|
) (
p2nc |N c〉 〈N c|+ p2nc |N c〉 〈N c|
)
.
In fact, this density matrix form can be applied onto both classical and quantum
strategies. So quantum mixture strategy is permitted to use by a quantum player.
Then the payoff value equ(15) turns into a density matrix form,
Ei = Tr
(
ρSH i
)
. (20)
Now our classical and quantum Prisoner’s Dilemma is redefined as
Γq =
(
S1,q ⊗ S2,q, (H1,q,H2,q)) and Γc = (S1,c ⊗ S2,c, (H1,c,H2,c)) . (21)
The classical game is defined in a subspace of the quantum game, and the classical
payoff matrix is the sub-matrix on the subspace.
Equilibrium state of the game — Now we have shown that our language can be
used to discuss this game. Although calculation of NE and a general algorithm is
not the main topic of this paper, finding some solutions and comparing them with the
solutions given in their original frameworks is quite attractive. In [5], Nash Equilibrium
is redefined and a Global Equilibrium State (GES) is proposed. And in [2], a Pareto
optimal state
(
Uˆ (0, π/2) , Uˆ (0, π/2)
)
is found. Now we try to check if there is a GES, if
not, if there is some other state which can be used to beat the Parato optimal strategy.
A Nash Equilibrium State ρSeq is defined as
Ei
(
ρseq
) ≥ Ei (Tri (ρseq) · ρi) ,∀i,∀ρi, (22)
in which Tri (·) means to do the trace in player i’s strategy space. If system state is a
direct product of all single-player states,
(
ρseq
)
=
∏
i
ρieq (23)
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then definition in equ(22) is equivalent with traditional NE,
Ei
(
ρseq
) ≥ Ei (ρ1eq · · · ρi · · · ρNeq) ,∀i,∀ρi. (24)
A special case of the first definition is
Ei
(
ρseq,m
) ≥ Ei (ρs) ,∀ρs,∀i. (25)
Although it is not always possible to find such a state ρSeq,m, if the game has one such
state then it is a dominant strategy, so we named it GES[5]. The reduced payoff matrix
H iR is the reduced matrix of H
i when all other players’ strategies are fixed,
H iR = Tr−i(ρ
1 · · · ρi−1ρi+1 · · · ρNH i), (26)
where Tr−i (·) means to do the trace in the space except player i’s space.
If both H1 and H2 have a common eigenvector, which has the maximum eigenvalue
in both the two payoff matrix, then this state is a GES. It’s probably an entangled
strategy state like the one of the game in [5]. Here we check if such state exists in
this game. Both H1 and H2 have eigenvalues 4s, 4r, 4p, 4t and other 12 zeros. The
corresponding eigenvector |4t〉1 6= |4t〉2 and |4s〉1 6= |4s〉2, but |4r〉1 = |4r〉2 and |4p〉1 =
|4p〉2. When t > r > p > s, there is no GES, but |Sm〉 = |4r〉1 = |4r〉2 are the system
state with second-maximum eigenvalue, on which both player 1 and player 2 get 4r.
The vector form of |Sm〉 is
|Sm〉 = 1
2
(|N cN c〉+ |N cN q〉+ |N qN c〉+ |N qN q〉) = 1
2
(|N c〉+ |N q〉) (|N c〉+ |N q〉) ,
or transfer it back into matrix form
Sm =


2 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0

 =
[ √
2 0
0 0
]
⊗
[ √
2 0
0 0
]
.
So Sm is not a unitary operator, although it leads to higher payoff, it might be unappli-
cable. And even it’s applicable, it’s not a NE. Because, player i can get more payoff by
adjust its own strategy. The role of such system state is that everyone knows it’s not a
best choice, but a good choice if both players can keep staying on such state, just like
the |N cN c〉 state in classical prisoner’s dilemma. Leaving from such state will at least
decrease the payoff of one player. Also state |4p〉1 = |4p〉1 has such similar property.
Now we discuss the reduced payoff matrix when player 2 or 1 choose Uˆ (θ2, φ2).
From equ(26),
H1R =


ǫ1 0 ǫ1 0
0 ǫ2 0 iǫ2
ǫ1 0 ǫ1 0
0 −iǫ2 0 ǫ2

 . (27)
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in which ǫ1 = s sin
2 1
2θ2 + r cos
2 1
2θ2, ǫ2 = p sin
2 1
2θ2 + t cos
2 1
2θ2. It has eigenvalues
{2ǫ2, 2ǫ1, 0, 0}. When t > r > p > s, the 2ǫ2 is the maximum eigenvalue for any θ2.
The corresponding eigenvector is (0, i, 0, 1)T , or in matrix form,
s1m =
[
0 0√
2i 0
]
,
which is obviously not a unitary matrix. Although it leads to higher payoff, it’s not
applicable. The same situation happens to player 2, so the payoff value of the both
players will be 4p. So non-unitary operators space gives a new NE,
∣∣E1 = 4p = E2〉.
Now we limit out strategies in unitary operator space. For a general unitary operator
strategy Uˆ (θ1, φ1), the payoff of player i is
Ei =
(
t cos2
θ(3−i)
2
+ p sin2
θ(3−i)
2
)
sin2
θi
2
+
(
r cos2
θ(3−i)
2
+ s sin2
θ(3−i)
2
)
cos2
θi
2
.
(28)
Since the first term is larger, the best response is θ1 = π. Similarly, when player 1 is
fixed at Uˆ (θ1, φ1). the best response of player 2 is Uˆ (π, φ2) = iF
q. Therefor, the NE
in quantum unitary strategy is
|S〉 =
∣∣E1 = p,E2 = p〉 = (i |F q〉 i |F q〉) . (29)
However, this NE strongly depends on equ(3), because we have more unitary operators.
In the whole unitary operator space defined by equ(12), with the parameters α, β, γ,
the payoff of player i is still in the form of equ(28), in which θi is replaced with γi. So
it’s still independent of α, β. Therefor, NE in this whole unitary operator space is
∣∣E1 = p,E2 = p〉 = ∣∣∣Uˆ (γ = π, α1, β1) , Uˆ (γ = π, α2, β2)〉 , (30)
where in operator form,
Uˆ (γ = π, α1, β1) = −i sin α− β
2
F c + i sin
α+ β
2
F q. (31)
So for our Quantum Prisoner’s Dilemma, the payoff from Quantum Nash Equilib-
rium is the same with the payoff from original Classical Nash Equilibrium. In this
sense, we say the quantization does not solve the dilemma, although instead of only
one NE in classical case, here the quantized game has more NEs (∀α, β). But if non-
unitary operators are applicable, we will have better NEs, such as
∣∣E1 = 4p = E2〉 and∣∣E1 = 4r = E2〉. And further more, if entangled states are permitted, the former NEs
will not be NEs anymore. In some cases, even GES can be found[5]. Usually, such GES
will not be a direct product state, so it includes correlation between players. This prop-
erty looks like cooperative behavior. Although this game has no GES, it’s still probably
to find general NE as equ(22) in this entangled strategy space. Unfortunately, we have
no applicable algorithm for such general NE. But if we can find them, it will probably
have bigger payoff and also be unitary in the system space. Then, we can say, a general
7
NE in entangled strategy space solves the dilemma. However, of course, since it’t not a
direct product state, it implies that something like negotiation and agreement are the
real reason to solve the dilemma. Anyway, even that, it’s a good news, which means
our representation is hopefully a way from non-cooperative game to cooperative game.
Conclusion — Now we see the new representation can be applied onto the Quantum
Prisoner’s Dilemma. In classical strategy space, it gives the same result with traditional
language,
∣∣E1 = p = E2〉; in quantum unitary operator strategy space, some new NEs,
which have the same payoff with classical NE, appears,
∣∣E1 = p = E2〉; in general
quantum strategy space including non-unitary operators, two new NEs appear in such
game,
∣∣E1 = 4p = E2〉 and ∣∣E1 = 4r = E2〉, but they are non-unitary operators; and at
last, if entangled strategy is permitted, the game here has no GES, but still probably
has NE. Unfortunately, now we have no way to get such NE. The existence of NE
in such strategy space calls more investigation. In fact, the definition proposed here
is for general NE in any strategy space, but without a proof of the existence and
no applicable algorithm. And frankly, we even have no idea if such general NE is
meaningful or not, because it requires non-direct-product state and/or non-unitary
operator. However, the point is no matter whether they have applicable meaning or
not, questions in Game Theory can be discussed in our new representation. Hopefully,
one day, it will bring new stuff into Game Theory. And it should be able to prove
that for all linear-probability-combination classical game and all linear-and-anti-linear-
amplitude-combination quantum game, the new representation is always valid[6].
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